STATUTES RELATING TO TELEPHONE COMPANIES.
for the purpose of repairing or extending its lines ; and it may also, with the
consent of a majority of the stockholders, increase the capital stock for the
purpose aforesaid. It may also, in its by-laws, determine the manner in which
the stock of the company shall be held and assigned.
§ 12. Every stockholder shall be liable in his individual capacity, for any
contract, debt, or engagement of such company to an amount over and above
his stock, equal to the face value of his stock.

Indiana has also enacted by a statute in force from February 13, 1883 (Laws, p. 9; Rev. Stat. ed. 1888, chap. 43,
§ 4192, d.):§ 1. Any operator, clerk, servant, messenger, or employ6 of any telephone
company doing business in this State, who discloses the contents of any dispatch, or message, or any conversation had between persons while using the
line of any telephone company, except to a Court of justice, or to a person
entitled to know the same, shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars,
nor less than ten dollars.
JOHN B. UHLE.
(To be continued.)

RECENT ENGLISH

CASE,

High Court of Appeals.
BUTLER v. THE MANCHESTER, SHEFFIELD, AND LINCOLNSHIRE
RAILWAY COMPANY.Where a by-law of a railway company provides that a passenger failing or
refusing to show or deliver up his ticket, when requested by a duly authorized agent of the company, shall be required to pay his fare from the station
whence the train started, but such by-law makes no provision for enforcing
this requirement, a passenger who has bought a ticket on condition of compliance with the by-laws, and has lost it, cannot be removed from the train
for refusing to comply with such by-law.
The right to remove a passenger for non-compliance with such a by-lawr cannot be implied as part of the contract of carriage.
Semble, per Lord EsuEn, M. R., that the by-law in question is not reasonable.
Semble, per LorEs, L. J., that no regulation providing for removal of a passenger from a train, for non-compliance with such a by-law, could be framed.
APPEAL from a judgment of MANISTY, J., in the Queen's
Bench Division, at the trial of an action for assault.
The plaintiff bad taken a ticket from Sheffield to Manchester and back, the ticket being marked, "subject to the
conditions contained in the company's time-tables and advertisements." One of these conditions was a by-law stating
VOL. XXXVIL-6
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that any passenger refusing to show or deliver up his ticket,
when requested by the duly authorized servant of the company,
should be required to pay the fare from the station, whence
the train originally started, to the end of the journey. Other
by-laws provided that persons intoxicated, or using bad language, or smoking in carriages not provided for that purpose,
should be removed from the company's carriages. On his return journey, just before reaching Sheffield, the plaintiff was
requested to produce the return-half of his ticket, but could
not do so, having lost it. He decliued to pay the ordinary
fare from Manchester, and offered his name. and address. He
refused to alight from the carriage, .and was removed by
force.

MANISTY, J., gave judgment for the defendants, hold-

ing it to be an implied term of the contract that, if the passenger failed to produce his ticket, his right to be carried
ceased, and that he might be removed from the carriage.
Waddy, Q. C., and Lawson Walton, for the plaintiff.
Lockwood, Q. C., and Cyril Dodd, for the defendants.
LORD ESHER, M. R. In this case the plaintiff, who was a
passenger by the defendants' railway, had paid for a ticket,
but had lost it. At a certain stage of the journey he was
asked to produce his ticket, and, not being able to do so, was
told that he must pay the ordinary third class fare from
Manchester to Sheffield. He refused to do so, and thereupon
the defendants' servants assumed the power of pulling the
plaintiff forcibly out of the railway carriage in which he was
travelling. The plaintiff brings an action of assault against
the defendants for this action of their servants; and the defendants assert that they were justified in removing the
plaintiff from their carriage by force, using no more force
than was necessary for the purpose of overcoming his resistance. The defendants put it that the plaintiff was unlawfully
upon their premises, and it is admitted that the allegation
that he was so is material to their defence. The question,
therefore, is whether it is true that he was unlawfully on
their premises. I do not think that is made out. What is
the nature of the relation between the plaintiff and the defendants? It is, as it appears to me, a contractual relation.
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It was alleged that the contract was for a right to go on the
defendants' land in the nature of an easement, but that, there
being no grant of an easement under seal, there was only a
license given by the defendants to go on their premises, which
they could revoke. All I will say with regard to that contention is that, though it may have been quite right for the
defendants' counsel to suggest the point, it seems to me,
when considered, to be contrary to good sense. To say that
a passenger by railway from London to Liverpool is to have
an easement all over the line between those places seems to
me really ridiculous; and the absurdity of such a view of the
case becomes greater when we remember that companies often
contract to convey passengers over the lines of other coinpanies. It seems to me, therefore, that the considerations upon
which the case of Wood v. Leadbitter (1845), 13 M. & W. 838,
turned are not applicable in this case. The dontract between
the plaintiffis and defendants really is that, on his paying the
fare for the journey, they will carry him in their carriage on
the journey, for which he has so paid the fare, using due care
for his safety while so doing. That contract may be subject
to conditions by reason of notice given to that effect upon the
ticket incorporating such conditions. In this case it is said
that the ticket referred to certain conditions, and thereby incorporated them into the contract. The only conditions
which can be alleged to be so incorporated into this contract
are the by-laws and regulations which the company made in
pursuance of the authority given them for that purpose by
statute. They can only make by-laws and regulations in
pursuance of their statutory powers, and accordingly we find
that they assume to make certain by-laws and regulations as
required under Railways Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845,
viz: under the seal of the company and with the approval of
the Board of Trade, and such regulations are the only conditions which can be looked on as incorporated by reference,
by this ticket. One of such by-laws and regulations provides that, "Every passenger shall shew and deliver up his
ticket to any duly authorized servant of the company when
required to do so for any purpose; and any passenger travelling without a ticket, or iiling or refusing to shew or deliver
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up his ticket as aforesaid, shall be required to pay the fare
from the station, whence the train originally started, to the
end of his journey." I do not think it is necessary for the
purposes of this case to discuss the question whether that is a
valid or reasonable regulation, or how far the plaintiff would
be bound by it if unreasonable. It would seem, if the decision
in Saunders v. South Eastern J-y. Co. (1880), L. R. 5 Q. B. D.
456, be correct, not to be reasonable. Whenever it becomes I
necessary we must deal with that question, but I think we
may, for the present purpose, assume that the condition is
reasonable. The effect of it is that the passenger is under an
obligation to show his ticket when asked to do so, and if he
fails to do so, a certain consequence is to follow, viz: that he
must pay the fare from the station whence the train started.
But suppose that he refused to do so, he no doubt breaks his
contract; but does it result that the company's servants may
lay hands on him and remove him from the carriage? I do
not think that it does. The remedy is by proceeding against
him for the amount of the fare he refuses to pay. Where
is there any contract by which he has agreed that, if he fails to
show a ticket or to pay the fare mentioned in the regulation,
the company may lay hands on him, and put him out of the
carriage by force? :No one has any right to lay hands
forcibly on a man in the absence of some legal authority to
do so, or some agreement to that effect. It is argued that
such right on the part of the company must be implied, but
no Court has a right to imply any term as between parties
which was not clearly and obviously within the contemplation of both the parties, and I cannot agree with the learned
Judge in the Court below in holding that such a term should
be implied. For these reasons I think his decision was
wrong, and that the appeal should be allowed, and judgment
entered for the plaintiff
LNDLEY, L. J. I am of the same opinion. The question'
raised by this ease is one of great importance both to the company and the passenger. One knows that railway companies
may be placed ingreatdifficulty by the unscrupulous attempts
of fraudulent persons to cheat them; and I do not desire to
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express any opinion one way or the other on the question
whether or not some condition might be made, which, if
properly worded, would justify the company in future in taking the course they claimed to take in the present case.
There does not seem to me to be any by-law or regulation in
this case which authorized the company to remove from their
carriage a passenger who failed to produce his ticket. That
consideration seems to me to be the key to the whole case.
How can the company justify laying hands on the plaintiff?
The plaintiff had taken his ticket, and the effect was that
there was a contract by the company to carry him to Manchester and back. There is no authority as yet to the effect
that such a contract of carriage is a contract for an interest
in land. It seems to me to be a totally different thing from
a contract for an interest in land; and it seems to me absurd
to test the case as one of a revocable license. It is a case of a
contract for carriage. The doctrine of Wood v. Leadbitter,
supra, does not 'appear to me to be at all applicable to the
case of such a contract. Supposing that the contract of carriage involved a contract for production of the ticket or payment of another fare, and the plaintiff broke that part of the
contract, does it follow as a matter of law that the defendants
could turn him out of the carriage? The remedy is to take
proceedings for the breach of contract on his part. It is argued that having broken the contract he was no longer lawfully on the defendants' premises. I do not see that that consequence follows. It does not appear to me that the contract
between the plaintiff and the defendants was cancelled by
reason of the plaintiff's breach of contract. In my opinion
the defendants failed to show that the plaintiff was unlawfully upon their premises, and therefore they had no right to
remove him therefrom by force. For these reasons I agree
that the appeal should be allowed.
LoPEs, L. J. It is somewhat extraordinary that there
should be no authority on such an important point as that
raised in the present case. To my mind the case is very clear.
In the first place, it is to be observed that there is no by-law
or regulation which can be relied on as protecting thedefend.1
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ants in respect of what their servants did in this case.
Whether any regulation could be framed which would do so,
I doubt; but it is unnecessary to express any opinion as to
that, because there is no such by-law or regulation in this
case. That being so, the question is whether the company's
servants were justified, in the absence of any such by-law or
regulation, in laying hands on the plaintiff as they did. The
plaintiff had, admittedly, properly taken his ticket for the
journey from Sheffield to Manchester and back, and had paid
the full fare for the journey, and admittedly he had lost his
ticket, accidentally. The effect is, to my mind, that he was
lawfully in the defendants' carriage. It seems to mesufficient
to state so much to show that the defendants were not justified in assaulting him as they did. It is argued that there
was a breach by him of an implied contract. I find it difficult to understand what the nature of the suggested implication could be, unless it were to be the effect that he agreed or
consented that, if he lost his ticket, the company should be
authorized to lay hands on him and remove him from their
carriage.
I see no evidence whatever of any contract of that kind.
If there were any breach of contract by him, it seems to me
clear that they were not entitled to lay hands on him, but that
their remedy would be by proceeding for the amount of the
fare which he refused to pay. The case of Wood v. Leadbitter, supra, was relied upon by the counsel for the defendants;
but I do not think that the principles enunciated in that case
have any application to the present. The question there was
as to the right to go upon land. The present case is one of a
contract to carry with reasonable care, and has nothing to do
with land or any easement over or license to go upon land.
It does not appear to me that any question as to the revocability or otherwise of a license arises. For these reasons I
agree that the appeal should be allowed.
The principal case is a good instance of how far the English Courts
will go to protect the rights of individuals against infringement by corporations. To any one unfamiliar

with English railway management
and English law, the statement of
LoPrs, L. J., that there is "no authority on such an important point as
that.raisedin the present case," would
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seem only less surprising than his
doubt whether any regulation could
be framed which would protect railway companies from the consequences
of expelling from a train a passenger
claiming to have lost his ticket during
the journey, and refusing on that
ground to comply with the by-law
sought to be enforced in the principal
case.
By the Railways Clauses Consolidation Act, 8 & 9 Vict. c. 20, § 103, any
person travelling in any carriage of a
railway company without having previously paid the fare, or beyond the
distance paid for, and with intent to
avoid payment, "shall for every such
offence forfeit to the company a sum
not exceeding forty shillings," and by
§ 104, such person may be at once
apprehended by the servants of the
company. The penalty is recoverable
in a summary proceeding before two
justices of the peace, and can be enforced by a distress warrant: §§ 145,
146. See Reg. v. Paget (1881), L. R.
8 Q. B. D. 151. The operation of this
law is strictly confined to cases of
fraudulent intent (Dearden v. Townsend (1865), L. R. 1 Q. B. D. 10), but to
its effective provisions it is probably
due in part that no authority bearing
directly on the principal case could be
found. Another reason for this must
lie in the English system of inspection
of ticllets before the train leaves any
principal station, which system,
though less thorough than the continental practice of inspection as the
passenger leaves the waiting-room at
any station, great or small, is apparently sufficient to warrant the belief
that the plaintiff had his ticket when
he got on the train, and had already
showed it.
Before considering the American law
on the expulsion of passengers for
not having proper tickets, it may be
as well to notice the decisions on the

statute above cited, and on by-laws
like that in the principal case.
The use of a non-transferable ticket
by one not the purchaser is fraudulent under this Act: Lungdon v. Howells (1879), L. R. 4 Q. B. D. 337. But
see Glocer v. L. 4- S. W. R. (1867),
L. R. 3 Q. B. D. 25, where a passenger
had a valid ticket himself, but gave
a ticket on which he had already
travelled to a friend to use over again,
this aid in the perpetration of a fraud
was held not to justify the former's
apprehension and detention under the
statute, though it would necessitate
nominal damages only in a suit for
illegal arrest.
In Dearden v. Townsend, supra, it
was held that as the company's bylaws must not be repugnant to the
statute, a by-law similar to that in the
principal case could only apply to attempts to'defraud the company,and not
to the case of a party travelling without
having paid for and obtained a ticket,
but with no attempt to defraud. In
that case the passenger had gone beyond the station for which he had
booked, and offered to pay the difference. For a parallel case on another
by-law, see Bentham v. Hoyle (1878),
L. R. 3 Q. B. D. 289.
Of course, as CoCmulUr, C. J., said
in Saunders v. S. E. R. (1880), L. R.
5 Q. B. D. 456, "the want of a ticket
affords prima facie evidence of fraud,
and entitles the company to put the
traveller to the proof of the absence
of a fraudulent intention. The refusal
to produce a ticket leads in like manner to the inference that the party has
none, and consequently to the inference of fraud."
In Jennings v. G. N. R. (1865), L.
R. 1 Q. B. D. 7, it was held that, such a
by-law being established for the benefit of the company, they must keep
strictly within its provisions. Where
they had allowed a passenger travel-
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ing in one part of a train, to retain
the tickets of the servants who accompanied his horses, the contract was
with the master, and when the train
was divided into sections, the master's
carriage going in the first section, the
servants ought not to have been prevented from following him in the other
section.
In Chilton v. L. J- C. R. (1847), 16
M. & W. 212, and Brown v. G. E. R.
(1877), L. R. 2 Q. B. D., 406, similar
by-laws were considered, but without
decision as to their validity. In the
latter case it was held that the bylaw must be enforced, by a demand
for the fare required by it, before the
passenger could be arrested under the
statute.
Such a by-law was held to apply to
the case of season-ticket holders in
Woodard v. E. C. R. (1861), 30 L. J.
M. C. 196.
In L. B. 4- S. C. R. v. Watson (1878),
L. R., 3 C. P. D. 429 ; s. c. on appeal
4 Id. 118 (a curious instance of English tenacity to principle, the sum in
controversy being one penny), and
Saunders v. S. E. R., supra, such bylaws were held invalid, on account of
the variable penalty imposed. As
LusH, J., said in the latter case, "A

passenger who has travelled only the
last ten miles in a train which has
travelled a hundred miles, is fined ten
times as much as another who started
at the station a quo, and whose ticket
was demanded at the end of ten miles,
although the offence of refusing to
show the ticket is precisely the same
in the one case as in the other. A
by-law which has this effect cannot be
deemed a reasonable by-law."
In the United States and Canada,
the laws making it an offence to attempt to travel without paying the
proper fare are rarely enforced. Railroad companies usually rely on the
simple remedy of putting the offender

summarily off the train. It is a wellsettled general rule that, as between
the railroad conductor and the passenger, the latter's ticket, or the stopover check sometimes given in its
place, is the only admissible evidence
of his right to travel; that lie must
produce it whenever called upon by
the conductor to do so, and also surrender it to him on request. It is
equally well settled that a railroad
company can expel from its trains all
persons who are neither provided with
such-tickets as the rules of the company require, nor willing to pay the
regular fare, plus such reasonable
sum as the, company may add when
fares are paid on the cars. Hence, if
the circumstances out of which the
principal case arose had occurred on
this side of the Atlantic, the plaintiff
could not have recovered, unless, perhaps, if the conductor had already
seen the ticket and cancelled it so
that it could not be used over again,
and remembered these facts. The
present note will, therefore, consider
only the limits of this unquestionable
right to eject passengers, the manner
in which it must be exercised, and
the damages for unlawful expulsion.
Loss of ticket. It may be laid down
as a rule, with one possible exception,
to be noted below, that the loss of a
ticket falls on the passenger.. Thus
in Duke v. G. IV. R. (1856), 14 U.
Can. Q. B. 377, the plaintiff had
bought a ticket from St. Catharine's
to Paris, but had lost it at the time
of, or after starting, and so informed the conductor. He demanded
the fare, and, on her refusal to pay,
put her off the train at Grimsby. The
judgment on the points reserved was
for the defendants, Bunss, J., saying,
"I do not see that the defendants
should be held responsible for the
loss of the ticket, which it was the
wife's duty to have taken care of, sup-
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posing that she in truth had one, as
the evidence of her having paid for
her seat. She chose to accept the contract of undertaking to produce that
evidence when required; and if, by
carelessness, negligence, or accident,
she has lost that evidence of payment,
she must be at the mercy of the defendants in regard to the fare being
demanded by the conductor, and can
have no legal right to say that the
loss excuses from performance of the
contract on her part, viz: to produce
the ticket when required."
Hamilton v. N. Y. C. etc., R. (1872),
51 N. Y. 100, is to the same effect.
The plaintiff had stopped over between.Buffalo and Albany, and on
resuming his journey failed to produce the coupon entitling him to
passage to Albany. The evidence was
in conflict as to whether he had left
this coupon in the train, or whether
the conductor had taken it up when
the plaintiff got off; but the Court
said that, even if he had merely lost
it, "by the terms of the ticket it was
good only upon its presentation, with
the checks attached, to the conductor.
If, therefore, the holder voluntarily or
negligently deprived himself'of that
right, or because unable, in consequence of his own act or omission, of
presenting (sic) the ticket in that form,
he could not claim any privilege or
right under it."
Similarly, it was
said in a steamboat case, "If the
plaintiff lost his ticket, it would be
his own loss, and not one which the
defendants were to bear :" Standish v.
Narr. Stbt. Co. (1873), 111 Mass. 512.
The same rule holds good in regard
to season tickets, whether the commuter has merely forgotten to have
his ticket with him, as in Downs v.
N. Y. N. H. 4- H. R. R. (1869), 36
Conn. 287, or has lost it, as in Cresson
v. P. 4- R. R. (1875), 11 Phila. (Pa.)
597. In the latter case, the plaintiff

had offered to indemnify the company
against any possible loss through use
of his ticket by another person; but
it was held, that this did not affect the
conductor's right to eject him.
The rule is also the same where the
conductor has taken up a ticket and
given a conductor's check in its place,
at least where there has been a change
of conductors and the check is demanded by the new one. In such a
case it has been held, that as the check
was as good as a ticket, "when [the
passenger] had lost it, the loss was
his, and he was situated as he would
have been if the ticket had been returned to him and he had lost that,
and as any one would be who bought
a ticket to any opera or a lecture, or
that would entitle the holder of it to
any other privilege, and had lost it.
Having lost it, he was called upon by
the proper conductor to pay his fare.
He had not any ticket or check to pay
it with, and refused to pay it in
money. Consequently, there was a
refusal to pay it at all, and the conductor rightly expelled him from the
train :" Jerome v. Smith (1876), 48
Vt. 230.
The case of a ticket for a berth in a
sleeping-car has been held not to be
within the rule. In Pullman P. C. Co.
v. Reed (1874), 75 Ill. 125, the plaintiff had bought a ticket for his berth,
but lost it before the train started,
and it was not found till the next
morning. He obtained a written statement from the ticket agent that he
had bought the ticket, but the conductor refused to let him stay in the
sleeping-car. The plaintiff was held
entitled to recover the price paid for
his ticket and a reasonable compensation for the trouble and inconvenience he suffered by being deprived of
his berth, but a judgment on a verdict for $3000 was reversed as excessive. This case clearly did not come
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under the general rule as to lost tick- their tickets beforehand, and the pasets, both because the plaintiff proved senger, finding no one in the ticketto the conductor that he had had a office, gets on the train without lookticket, but had lost it, and because a ing to see if the ticket-agent is anyberth-ticket, being limited to a par- where about the station: . 4- St. L.
ticular berth on a particular day, R. v. Kennedy (1881), 77 Ind. 507.
could not be used more than once, so But if the ticket-office be shut and
that the company could have suffered the passenger be guilty of no neglino loss by allowing the plaintiff to re- gence, he is entitled to passage on the
tain his berth, even if the ticket had train on payment of his fare: S. K.
been found by an outsider.
R. v. Hindsdale, February 11, 1888,
The only possible exception to the Sup. Ct. Kan.; Brown v. K. Cy., H.
rule is that already alluded to, where S. 4- G. R., Id.
the conductor has already seen and
In Shelton v. L., S. 4- M. S. Ry. Co.
punched the passenger's ticket, so (1876), 29 0. 214, which was cited by
that it could not be used again, and defendants' counsel in the principal
remembers this fact. There would
case, but not referred to by the Court,
seem to be no decision on this point, the company had made a rule that a
but in Hibbardv. N.Y 6- E. 1. (1857),
passenger who failed to produce a ticket
15 N. Y. 455, 461, it was said obiter or pay his fare should be put off the
that the conductor could not be pre- train; and this was held reasonable,
sumed to remember such a fact. See even where the ticket had, before the
Robson v- N. Y. C., etc., R. (1880),
passenger entered the train, been
21 Hun (N. Y.), 387, the conductor wrongfully taken from him by a servant of the company. The same dochad seen and punched the plaintiff's
tickets before the latter lost them. As, trine was upheld in Townsend v. N.
however, the case was decided on the N. C. etc., R. (1879), 56 N. Y. 295,
ground that the expulsion, having where a passenger whose ticket, entitling him to stop over, had been
been made without any demand for
the fares, was illegal, the effect of the wrongfully taken up early in his jourconductor's knowledge that the plain- ney, and he stopped over without any
tiff had had his tickets was not passed ticket whatever.
Expired tickets. It is familiar law
upon.
It may be observed in this connec- that, if a railroad ticket of any kind
be limited on its face to use within a
tion, in regard to conductor's checks,
that in Jerome v. Smith, supra, the certain time, it is not good after that
check was asked for by a new con- date, and the passenger presenting it
ductor, who could not have known may be expelled from the train, if he
that the plaintiff had received one.
refuse to pay his fare. And it is imOther cases of failure to produce a material that the passenger be ready to
ticket. Where a passenger has care- start and go to the station before midlessly taken a train which does not night of the day the ticket expires, if
stop at his station, and refuses to pay the last train of that day have actuhis fare to the first stopping-place be- ally left: Arnold v. P. R. B. (1886),
yond, he may be summarily ejected: 115 Pa. 135. But it is sufficient if the
A., T. 6- S. F. R. v. Gants, February journey be begun before midnight of
11, 1888, Sup. Ct. of Kan. So where the day on which the ticket expires.
the company requires passengers trav- It need not be completed before that
elling on freight trains to purchase time: G. S. R. v. Bigelow (1881), 68
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Ga. 219; Evans v. St. L., L, M. J-S.
R. (1882), 11 Mo. App. 463; Auerbach v. N. Y. C., 6-c., R. (1882), 89
N. Y. 281; s. c. 21 AmxacEw LAW
IEOISTBR, 790 and note. In such case
the journey must be continuous. A
passenger cannot stop over, and resume his journey after the expiration
of his ticket: Hill v. S. B. f N. Y.
R. (1875), 63 N. Y. 101.
If the limitation does not appear on
the face of the ticket, and there is no
proof that the passenger knew that
such tickets were limited, and sold as
such, he cannot be ejected from the
train: P. R. R. v. ,Spicker (1884), 105
Pa. 142.
The words "good for this trip
only" on a ticket have been held to
relate to the journey, and not to time,
so that the ticket can be used at any
time within six years: Pier v. Pinch
(1859), 24 Barb. (N. Y.) 514.
If a ticket be invalid from lapse of
time, or any other cause, except that
it has been already used over the
whole distance, or has been obtained
by fraud, the passenger has a right to
reclaim it, as evidence of value paid:
Vankirk v. P. R. R. (1874), 76 Pa. 66.
Stopping over.-The authorities are
clear that a railroad ticket is good
only for a continuous passage between
the points named thereon, unless the
ticket itself or the rules of the company expressly provide otherwise,
and that, if the company requires a
stop-over checkoto be obtained, such
rule must be complied with. In the
absence of any stop-over privilege,
stopping over is regarded- as an
abandonment of the right to demand
passage for the rest of the distance:
Drew v. C. P. R. (1876), 51 Cal. 425;
Stone v. C. 4- N. W. R. (1877), 47
Ia. 82; Hill v. S. B. 4- N. Y. R.
(1875), 63 N. Y. 101; Deitric v. P.
R. R. (1872), 71 Pa. 432. A ticketagent at a way station has generally

no authority to vary the terms of the
ticket in this respect: McClure v.
P. W. 6- B. R. R. (1871), 34 3d. 532.
But a train-agent or conductor can
usually do so: Tarbell v. N. C. R.
(1881). 24Hun (N.Y.), 51. Suchpermission is valid only for the particular
stop for which it is given, and not for
a second stop: Denny v. N. Y. C., etc.
R. (1874), 5 Daly (N. Y.), 50. And
where the company's rules provided
that train-agents only should authorize stopping over, and the passenger,
having stopped over, had told the
train-agent of the second train that
train had
the conductor of the first
authorized the stop, he was not allowed to show that such authority
had really been given by the trainagent: Petrie v. P. R. R. (1880), 42
N. J. L. 449.
Where a ticket entitled the passenger to stop over at any point for which
he had a coupon, and the conductor
took up the coupon for passage from
A. to B., and also that from B. to C.,
giving in exchange a check with no
stop-over privilege, and the plaintiff
stopped over at B., it was held that
by the contract he was not bound to
give notice of his stop, but could form
the intention of stopping at any time
before the train left B., and also that,
the company having, for its own purposes, demanded of him the proper
evidence of the contract, it was bound
to put him in as good a position as if
he had not parted with such evidence.
Hence, his action was maintainable:
Palmer v. C. C. J- A. R. (1872), 3 S.
C. (N. S.) 580.
In JMaine all tickets, except excursion, return and other special tickets
at reduced rates, are good for six
years from the date of issue, may be
used on any train, and entitle the
holder to "stop at any station along
the line of the road at which such
trains stop:" R. S. Maine, 1884,
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p. 4771, Tit. iv. c. 51, s. 44. See Dryden
v. G. T. B. (1872), 60 Me. 512; Carpenter v. G. T. R. (1881), 72 Id. 388.
Irregular tickets.-Tickets must be
used in accordance with the conditions under which they are issued.
Hence, where a ticket provides that
the coupons attached shall be void if
detached, and a passenger presents
coupons without the ticket, he can be
required to pay his fare or leave the
train: Marshallv. B. 4- A. R. (1887),
145 Mass. 164; Walker v. Dry Dock,
etc. R. (1867), 33 How. (N. Y.) 327;
Hamilton v. N. Y. C., etc. R. (1872),
51 N. Y. 101 ; H. T. C. R. v. Ford,
53 Tex. 364. So if a non-transferable
ticket be used by one to whom it was
not issued: Cody v. C. P. R. (1876),
U. S. Ciro. Ct. Dist. Nev., 4 Saw. 114.
So if a ticket for passage from one
station to another be attempted to be
used in the reverse direction: Keeley
v. B. 6" M. R. (1878), 67 Me. 163.
It is also well settled that if a railroad
has more than one line between two
points, a passenger having a through
ticket must go by the most direct
route: Bennett v. N. Y. C., etc. R.
(1877), 69 N. Y. 594.
Where a passenger's ticket purports to entitle him to travel on any
regular train, and he has no notice
that it is restricted to special trains,
he is entitled to travel on it: Maroney
v. 0. C. 4-N. R. (1870), 106 Mass.
153. This is especially so where a
servant of the company has told the
passenger to get on the train, and
he offers to pay the regular fare for
passage on such trains: L. S. 6- M.
S. R. v. Rosenzweig (1886), 113 Pa.
519. In that case it was argued that
it was the duty of the purchaser of a
ticket to know on what train it could
be used, and that the company's rules
and regulations were part of the contract, but the Court said, p. 538,
"The legal presumption of knowledge

has never been extended to the bylaws and regulations of private corporations. No necessity has been
shown for judicial enunciation that
there is a legal presumption, or a
fiction of law, that a person about
to become a passenger, or who has
become a passenger on a railway,
knows the rules and regulations of
the railway company."
In P. R. R. v. Connell (1884), 112
Ill.
295, the appellee's ticket had a
coupon for passage over the appellant's line from Philadelphia to New
York, but the Wabash company, who
sold it, had previously had its authority to sell such tickets revoked, and
in fact sold it with the expectation
that the Baltimore and Ohio company
would. change the coupon for one by
the Philadelphia and Reading line;
but the appellee was not told this
when he bought the ticket, nor had
he any knowledge that it would not
be received on the appellant's road.
He attempted to use it on that road,
and was ejected from the train. Judgment was reversed for error in the
measure of damages, but the Court
was of opinion that the ticket, having
been sold by the Wabash company as
agent for the appellant, was valid according to its terms. It is noticeable
that the Court did not refer to the revocation of the agency. Of course, as
a general rule, a principal who has
made public the existence of an
agency must also give publicity to its
revocation; but all that a passenger
usually knows of the relations between the various companies over
whose lines his ticket takes him is
that the ticket itself states that the
company that sold it did so as agent
for the others, no statement of the
fact of this agency being made to him
by the principals. Hence it is hard
to see how the case comes within that
rule of agency, or how the appellee's
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position differed from what it would
have been had the Wabash company
never been at any time the appellant's
agent.
Irregularitiesin purchaseof tickets.A ticket bought from any one not a
general agent of the railroad company
for the sale of its tickets, is bought at
the passenger's risk in case such
ticket turn out to be irregular. H. 4T. C. R. v. Ford (1880), 53 Tex. 364.
In that case the ticket was bought of
one not an agent of the defendant,
and had been issued by an agent of
another company, which was authorized by defendant to issue its tickets
in a prescribed form. This ticket was
not in that form, and the plaintiff had
to leave the train. It was held that
he could not recover, both for the
reason above given and because the
words, "not good if detached," on the
face of the ticket were notice that it
could not be used in the way the
plaintiff attempted to use it. But if
the ticket had been properly issued,
and is valid on its face, the fact that
it was bought of a "ticket scalper"
in a State where "scalping" is lawful, does not invalidate it for use even
in a State where such unauthorized
selling is forbidden: Sleeper v. P. R.
R. (1882), 100 Pa. 259.
A passenger who seeks to travel on
a ticket which he had paid for in
counterfeit money, must pay his fare
or leave the train, even if he did not
know the money was counterfeit: M.
4- C. R. v. 0astine (1877), 54 Miss.
503. Similarly, a bona fide holder of
a properly stamped and dated ticket,
which has been obtained by fraud,
can make no use of it, though he be
without notice of the fraud: Frank v.
Ingalls (1885), 41 0. St. 560.
Where a passenger bought his
ticket on the train, and the conductor
afterwards found that he had given
too much change, and the former re-

fused to examine his change to see if
the conductor was right, it was held
that, as he had the means at hand to
learn the truth, he could not recover
for his expulsion: McCarthy v. C. R.
I. - P. R. (1876), 41 Iowa, 432.
Acts and statements of ticket agents
and others.-Such acts and statements
do not usually affect the general
American rule, given above, in regard
to controversies between a conductor
and a passenger. Hence where, as in
Frederickv. M. H. 6- 0. R. (1877), 37
Mich. 342, a passenger requests and
pays for a ticket to his destination,
but receives one for a shorter distance,
and is ejected, he can sue for the
breach of contract in giving him the
wrong ticket, but not for the tort in
expelling him. To the same effect, C.
B. 4. Q. R. v. Griffin (1873), 68 Ill.
499; Bradshaw v. S. B. R. (1883),
135 Mass. 407. So where a passenger
asks for a stop-over check, but is
given a trip-check by mistake, and,
on resuming his journey, is ejected:
Gorton v. 31. L. S. 4- W. R. (1882),
54 Wis. 234. And where the ticketagent had told the plaintiff that he
could take a certain train to his destination, and he got on the trajn accordingly, but the train was not one
of those that stopped at his station,
it was held that the conductor could
lawfully eject him for refusing to pay
his fare to the station beyond, although he had a right of action against
the company for not carrying him to
his station: L. S. 4- I. S. R. v. Pierce
(1882), 47 Mich. 277.
There are some cases which are held
not to come under the above rule, but
the distinction is not very clear. Thus
in Murdock v. B. 4. 0. R. (1884), 137
Mass. 293, where the ticket agent had
given the plaintiff a ticket already
punched, and the latter had noticed
this and asked about it, and the agent
explained how it happened, and said
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that the ticket was perfectly good, it
was held that the plaintiff had a right
to act on the agent's statements and
explanations, and to refuse to leave
the train. In Hufford v. G. R. 4- 1.
R. (1885), 53 Mich. 118, the plaintiff
believed in good faith that the ticket
which he had bought from the authorized agent of the company, was genuine, issued by the company, and such
as the agent had a right to sell, but
the conductor refused to receive it,
stating that it bore the marks of having been used before. The plaintiff
stated the facts to the conductor,
but was ejected. It was at first
said that, when the plaintiff found
that the ticket was not good, he
should have paid his fare; though, if
it were apparently good, he could refuse to leave the car. When the case
(February 3, 1887) came up again,
after another trial, the Court went
further, and said that the conductor
was bound to accept the facts stated
by the plaintiff as true, until the contrary was proven, without regard to
any words, figures, or other marks on
the ticket. In P. W. 4- B. R. v. Rice
(1886), 64 Md. 63, the return-coupon
of the plaintiff's ticket had been accidentally punched on the outward trip
by the conductor, who then failed to
correct his error on the ticket in the
way the company's rules required.
It was held that as the plaintiff was
in no fault whatever, his expulsion
on the return journey was wholly
illegal.
Several cases have grown out of the
provisions in certain return tickets,
requiring that the holder be identified
before his return by an agent at the
place to which the ticket is issued,
and sin the ticket before such agent,
who shall then stamp the ticket in
due form. If a passenger neglect to
comply with this rule, lie can be
ejected, and has no remedy: Moses v.

E. T. V. 4- G. R. (1884), 73 Ga. 356.
If he seek to comply, but the agent,
being the proper agent of the company
issuing the ticket, refuse to identify
and stamp the ticket, the passenger
can recover in tort if ejected: Head
v. G. P. R., S. Ct. Ga., Dec. 20, 1887.
And where the ticket was signed before and stamped by an agent at another place than that designated,
evidence that he was an authorized
agent of the company is admissible to
show a waiver of the condition: Taylor v. S. 4- R. R. (1888), 99 N. C.
185. But where the ticket was to a
point beyond the defendant's line,
'and the agent of the second carrier
was the proper party to apply to, and
the plaintiff went to the office of such
agent at the proper time, but found it
shut, it was held that he could not
proceed against the defendant, as the
party in fault was not its agent: Mosher v. St. L., L, .31. 4- S. R. (1888),
127 U. S. 390.
As a general rule, all evidence of
previous waivers of the company's
rules by its servants is irrelevant:
Sherman v. C. 4- N. W. R. (1874),
40 Iowa, 45; Keely v. B. 6- M. R.
(1878), 67 Me. 163; Marshall v. B.
4- A. R. (1887), 145 Mass. 164; Hill
v. S. B. 4A.M. Y.R. (1875), 63 N.Y.
101. But where a commutation-ticket, on its face not valid unless signed
by the holder, has been honored several times by the company's servants,
although not signed, such waivers of
the requirement bind the company,
and the ticket can be used without
a signature: Kent v. B. 6- 0. R.
45 Ohio St. 284.
L. E. 4- W. R. v. Fix (1882), 88
Ind. 381, is a peculiar case. The conductor of a train, fearing arrest, hid
himself on the engine and sent a
brakeman to take up the tickets. He,
being unused to the work, took up
the wrong half of a return ticket, and
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the plaintiff, who had not noticed the
mistake, was only able to produce the
outward coupon, on his return journey, and was ejected in consequence.
He was allowed to recover for the expulsion.
How far the statements of a ticket
agent are admissible as evidence in an
action against a railroad company is
another question. In M3feblille v. B.
4- P. R. (1882), 2 Mack. (D. C.) 63,
it was held that a ticket issued on certain conditions, and signed by the
passenger, was such a .written contract as could not be altered by evidence of what a ticket-agent said. 'In
Rawitzky v. L. 4- N. R (La.), 3 South.
R. 357, it was held that a passenger
could not recognize one part of a
clause in the conditions of a ticket
which he had signed, and repudiate
another part of the same. In Burnham v. G. T. R. (1873), 63 Me. 298,
the real contract was held to be that
made between the plaintiff and the
ticket-agent, before the former saw the
ticket, and that evidence of this
verbal contract was admissible to do
away with the effect of the words
"good for this day only," 'which were
printed on the ticket; and in Robinson v. L. 4- N. R. (1879); 2 Lea
(Tenn.) 594, an ordinary ticket was
said not to be such a written contract
as to exclude parol representations,
made at its sale. In Vankirk v. P. R.
R. (1874), 76 Pa. 66, the ticket-agent's
statements, made some days after the
ticket was sold, were held evidence of
the passenger's good faith, but their
admissibility to establish a contract
was not decided.
Though a servant of the railroad
company may have been in fault, contributory negligence on the plaintiff's
part will prevent a recovery. Thus,
where a father, travelling with his
lunatic son, got out for a few minutes
at a station, leaving the son in the

car, and the son moved to another
part of the train, and before the father
could find him, his ticket was demanded by the conductor, who, not
knowing that he was a lunatic, nor
that his father had bought the tickets, put him off the train. The father
was held to have no right of action:
Willetts v. B. 4- B. A. (1853), 14
Barb. (N. Y.) 585.
It is-thedutyof a railroad company
to'provide seats for its passengers,
hence if a passenger can find no seat
on a train, his refusal to produce his
ticket does not make him a trespasser,
and he cannot be ejected, except at a
regular station,: Hardenberghv. St. P.,
1f. 4- M1. R., S. Ct. Minn., June 18,
1888. But if he refuse to show his
ticket without good reason, merely because he cannot get a perfectly satisfactory seat, he becomes a trespasser:
Al. 4- C R. v. Benson, 85 Tenn.
627; C:, 0. 4- S. R. v. Wells, Id.
613.
Payment on trains.-Itis well settled
that a passenger paying his fare on a
train may be required to pay a reasonable amount, usually ten cents, in
excess of the rate at the ticket office,
and that he may be ejected for refusal
t6 do so. To warrant the enforcement
of such a rule, there must have been
an office at the station, where the passenger could buy his ticket: Poole v.
N. P. R., S., Ct. Oregon, April 30,
1888; and it must have been kept
open for a reasoniable time before the
train was advertised to leave: C. B.
4- Q. R. v. Parks (1857), 18 I1. 460;
St. L., A. 4- C. R. v. Dalby (1857),
19 Id. 353; 0. 6- A. R. v. flagg
(1867), 43 Id. 364; L C. R. v. Johnson (1873), 67 Id.312; Painev. C.R.
L 6- P. R. (1877), 43 Iowa, 569;
Hl v. S. C. R., S. Ct. S. C., March
20,1888. The case of Curlv. C. R. L
4-P. R. (1884), 63 Iowa, 417, is not
an authority to the contrary, as the
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absence of the ticket agent was not
the ground of the refusal to pay the
extra fare. In New York, however,
the contrary has been held: Bordeaux
v. Erie R. (1876), 18 Hun (N. Y.)
After the regular- time for
579.
a train to leave, even though it be
delayed, it is no longer the company's
duty to keep the ticket-offiee open:
St. L., A. 4- T. H. R. v. South (1867),
43 111.176; C.B.4- Q.R.v. Griffin
(1873), 68 Id. 499 ; T. W. 4: Wr B.
v. Wright (1879), 68 Ind. 586; Swan
v. 31. 6- L. R. (1882), 132 Mass. 116.
How long the right to pay fire lasts.If a passenger who has produced no
ticket, or an irregular one, though at
first unable or unwilling to .pay the
fare demanded of him, offer to do so
at any time before steps have been
taken to eject him, the conductor
ought to, accept the fare : C. B. 4- Q.
R. v. Bryan (1878), 90 Ill. 126;
O'Brian v. N. Y. C., etc. R. (1880),
80 N. Y. 236. And the conductor
ought not to act hastily in stopping
the train. A passenger who is acting
in good faith may reasonably suppose
that his argument or explanation will
have weight with the conductor; and
if the first intimation to the contrary
is the latter's pulling the bell-cord, it
is even then not too late to tender the
fare - T 4- P. R. v. Bond (1884), 62
Tex. 442. So, if a passenger have
not money enough to pay the full fare
demanded, but says that her will try
to borrow it, he must be- allowed a
reasonable time in which to do so:
Curl v. C., R.I. 4- P. R. (1884), 63
Iowa, 417. But, as a general rule,
after the conductor has stopped the
train and begun to eject the passenger, it is too late for him to produce a
valid ticket, if he has one: State v.
Campbell (1867), 32 N.J. L. 309 ; Hzbbard v. N. Y. 4- E. R. (1857), 15 N.
Y. 455, 462; or the ticket accompanying a detached coupon which he has

presented: L. N. 4- G. S. R. v. Harris (1882), 9 Lea (Tenn.), 180, or to
offer to pay his fare: Bland v. S. P.
R. (1880), 55 Cal. 570: Foffbauer v.
D. 4- N. IV. R. (1879), 52 Iowa, 342;
C. S. 4- C. R. v. Skillman (1883), 39
0.444; Gould v. C. M. 4- St. P. B.,
U. S. C. Ct. Dist. Minn. (1883), 18
Fed. Rep. 155. And if the ejected
passenger get on the train again, he
may', though he offer to pay his fare,
be again ejected: O'Brien v. B. 4- W.
1R. (1860), 15 Gray (Mass.), 20. The
same rule holds if a passenger, having been put off at a regular station,
offer to pay his fare: Pease v. D., L.
4- WV.R. (1886), 101 N. Y 367. The
case of S. G'. B v. Nix (1882), 68 Ga.
572, seems to be contrary to the rule,
but the decision was probably warranted by the conductor's hasty
action.
It has been held that if the passenger be not a trespasser, and another
passenger offer to pay the fare, even
after the ejection has begun, the
conductor ought to receive it: Guy v.
N. Y., 0. 4- IV. R. (1883), 30 Hun,
(N. Y.) 399, it was said, obiter, that
if a passenger be ejected at a regular station, and there purchase a
ticket or tender his fare for the whole
journey, including the distance already traversed, lie ought to be taken
on the train. The dictum as to tendering the fare is probably overruled
by Pease v. D., L. 4- WV. R., supra.
In Stone v. C. 4- N. TV. B. (1877), 47
Iowa, 82, the plaintiff had been ejected
for want of a proper stop-over check,
but bought a ticket for the rest of his
journey and attempted to get on the
train again, when the conductor prevented his doing so. In Swan v. Mi.
4- L. R. (1882), 132 Mass. 116, the conductor had told the ticket-agent not to
sell-a ticket to the plaintiff, who had
just been ejected. In both these cases
O'Brien v. B. 4- TV. R., supra, was
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relied on, and the plaintiff not allowed
to recover, and in the Iowa case, the
Court added, "This ruling by no
means excludes him from any other
train." O'Brien v. B. 6- W. B. seems
hardly an authority for these cases,
as the ground of the ruling there was
that the plaintiff, irrespective of his
having been ejected, had no right to
take passage on the train except at a
regular station. The Court did indeed hold that the plaintiff's position
would have been the same, even if he
had been put off at a regular station,
but that was not necessary to the decision.
It is hard to understand
how common carriers can refuse to
enter into the usual contract of carriage with a man, merely because he
has just been guilty of an actionable
breach of contract with them, or even
because he has trespassed on their
property, so long as they do not prosecute him, or how, if they can refuse
to contract with him, the mere inconvenience of his having to wait for
the next train can suffice to purge
him of the consequences of his trespass or breach of contract, as was
held in Stone v. C. 4-N. W. R., supra.
In O'Brien v. B.
W.
W R., supra, it
was said that the plaintiff could not call
on the railroad company "to perform
the same contract which he had previously broken." In that case, the
contract was rightly viewed as the
same one, as a new one could not have
been entered into except at a regular
station, but what the plaintiff sought
in Stone v. C. 6-N. W. R. and Scean
v. M. 4- L. R., was clearly a new
contract.
Expulsion of passengers.-Ifa passenger claim to have lost his ticket, the
conductor must give him a reasonable
time in which to find it. What is a
reasonable time is a question of fact
for the jury: 1. - G. N. R. v. Wilkes,
S. Ct. Texas, October 18, 1887. This
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is especially true in the case of commuters : .Maples v. N. Y., N. H. 6H. R. (1871), 38 Conn. 557. As already noticed, a passenger cannot be
putkoff a train until he has been asked
to pay his fare: Robson v. N. Y. C. 6C. R. (1880), 21 Hun (N. Y.), 387,
and given a reasonable time in which
to decide whether to do so or not, T. 4P. R. v. Bond (1884), 62 Tex. 442, or
in which to borrow money: Curl v. C.
R. L 6-P. R., supra.
It has been held that if a passenger,
with a ticket marked "good this day
only," stops over, in reliance on the
ticket-agent's assurance that he is entitled to do so, and the conductor has
no reason to disbelieve the passenger's
story, he must offer to refund the
value of the unused part of the ticket,
or to deduct the amount from the fare
demanded, before he can eject the
passenger: Burnham v. G. T. R.
(1873), 63 Me. 298. This case grew
out of facts occurring before the adoption of the Maine statute, cited supra,
entitling passengers to stop over.
Similarly a passenger cannot be
ejected for refusing to pay the extra
fare charged on trains, until what he
has already paid be refunded: Bland
v. S. P. R. (1880), 55 Cal. 570. But
where the amount paid did not exceed the fare, at the, rate charged on
trains to the point where the passenger was ejected, the conductor has
been held entitled to retain this sum:
Hoffbour v. D. 4- N. W. B. (1879),
52 Iowa, 342.
A passenger, who is not a trespasser,
can in general only be put off at a
regular station: Maples v. N. Y., N.
H. 4- H. R. (1871), 38 Conn. 557;
Hardenberghv. St. P. M. 4- M. R., S.
Ct. Minn. June 18, 1888; Arnoldv. P.
R. R. (1886), 115 Pa. 135. But a
trespasser can be put off anywhere,
provided it can be done without exposing him to serious danger: Mcalure
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v. P. W . 4- B. R. (1871), 34 Md. 532; amount to contributory negligence:
Wyman v. N. P. B. (1885), 34 Minn. Brown v. M. 4- C. R., U. S. C.
210; C. S. 6- C. B?. v. Skillinan (1883),
Ct., W. Dist. Tenn. (1881), 7 Fed.
39 Ohio St. 444. In Illinois a statute Rep. 51, and the company will not be
requires that any expulsion shall take liable for any injuries he may receive,
place at a regular station: See T. H. unless inflicted wilfully, wantonly, or
A. 6-c. B. v. Vanatta (1859), 21 Ill. maliciously: A. T. 4- S. Fe R. v.
188. And even if a passenger offers Gants, supra.
to leave the train at once, and it is
Though a railroad company is
stopped for him, and he then refuses, chargeable only with ordinary care tothis is no excuse for not taking him wards trespassers, it cannot expose
to the next station: C. 4- N. W. B. v. them to serious risks: Rounds v. D. L.
Peacock (1868), 48 111. 253. But if the 4- W. R. (1876), 64N. Y. 129; Arnold
passenger be lawfully ejected, and v. P. B. B., supra. Thus where a
suffer no special damage. he can only man, who was helplessly drunk, was
recover nominal damages for being ejected in the snow at a distance from
put off away from a regular station:
a station, and was badly frozen in
C. 4- A. B. v. Roberts (1866), 40 Ill. consequence, the company was held
503. A similar statute in Indiana has liable: L. C. 4- L. B. v. Sulliran
been held permissive only, and not (1884), 81 Ky. 624. And expulsion
directory: Jeff. R. v. Rogers (1867),
at midnight, at a flag station, far distant from any other station, or in a
28 Ind. 1; s. c. (1871), 38 Id. 116;
T. W. 4- W. K v. Wright (1879), 68 severe storm, remote from shelter,
may be evidence of reckless, wanton,
Id. 586.
The expulsion may be effected by and oppressive action on the conforce, provided no more force be used ductor's part: Evans v, St. L., I. M.
than is necessary to overcome resist- 4- S. B. (1882), 11 Mo. App. 463;
Vanicirk v. P R. R. (1874), 76 Pa. 66.
ance: Gallena v. E. S. R. R., U. S.
C. Ct., E. Dist. Ark. (1882), 19 Fed. But where a drunken trespasser was
Rep. 116; Coleman v. N. Y.,N . H. 4- ejected and left near the track, and
H. R. R. (1870), 106 Mass. 160; G. was run over half a mile away from
W. R. Co. v. Miller (1869), 19 Mich. the station where he was displaced,
305; State v. Ross (1857), 26 N. J. there was held to be no evidence that
L. 224; Jardine"v. Cornell, S. Ct. N. this was a proximate result of the expulsion: Haley v. C. 4- N. W. R.
J., June 20, 1888.
Though a passenger, who is entitled (1866), 21 Iowa, 15.
to travel, may lawftrlly refuse to leave
Damages.-If a passenger be unlawthe train, he must not forcibly resist fully expelled from a train, he can rean expulsion, but must rely upon his cover for bodily injuries, for damage
legal remedies: Hall v. H. 4- C. R., to his business from loss of time, and
U. S. C. Ct., W. Dist. Tenn. (1882),
also for the indignity and injury to his
15 Fed. Rep. 57, 61; A. T. 4- S. Fe feelings : C. 4- N. W. R. v. Williams
R. v. Gants, S. Ct. Kan., February 11, (1870), 55 Ill. 185 ; C. 4- N. W. B. v.
1888; P. R. R. v. Connell (1884),
Chrisholm (1875), 79 Id. 584; Hicks v.
112 Ill. 295; Bradshaw v. S. B. R. H. 4- S. J. B. (1878), 68 Mo. 329 ;
(1883), 135 Mass. 407; Lillis v. St. Quigley v. C. P. B. (1876), 11 Nev.
350; Allen v. C. 4- P. S. F. Co.
L. K. (7. 6- N. R. (1877), 64 Mo. 464;
(1884), 46 N. J. L. 198; D. L. 4Townsend v. N. Y. C., etc. R. (1874),
W. B. v. Walsh (1885), 47 Id. 548;
56 N. Y. 295. His resistance may

